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Note
A Mock Funeral for a First Amendment Double
Standard: Containing Coercion in Secondary
Labor Boycotts
Dan Ganin∗
Amidst a series of plangent marches, union members
staged a mock funeral procession outside a Florida hospital in
March 2004.1 Through this bit of ambulatory street theater, the
union was not protesting the treatment of hospital employees
nor the quality or cost of medical care.2 Rather, it was objecting
to the labor practices of two subcontractors retained by the
hospital to perform construction and staffing work.3 The union
hoped that by inducing hospital clients to withhold their patronage they could persuade the hospital to sever commercial ties
with the subcontractors.4 In the parlance of labor law, this type
of protest is referred to as a “secondary boycott” and it is regulated under provisions of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), which prohibits unions from “coercing” secondary parties into terminating economic relations with any other person
or entity.5
Two federal appellate courts were charged with determining whether the mock funeral could be enjoined under the sec∗ J.D. Candidate 2009, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2004,
Macalester College. I would like to thank the board and staff of the Minnesota
Law Review for their diligent editorial work, Professor Heidi Kitrosser, and
my friends and family. I would also like to thank Alexis Gerber and the invariably overlapping members of Charles De Gaulle, Metrodome, and Royal
Crow for injecting a modicum of sanity and repose into scholarly travails.
Copyright © 2008 by Dan Ganin.
1. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, Local 15 v. NLRB, 491 F.3d 429,
432–33 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
2. See Kentov v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n Local 15, 418 F.3d
1259, 1261, 1266 (11th Cir. 2005) (detailing how the union had a primary labor dispute with two nonunion contractors, rather than the hospital itself ).
3. Id. at 1261.
4. Id. at 1263, 1266.
5. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (2000).
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ondary boycott provision as coercive activity.6 In deciding the
issue, the two circuits arrived at wildly inconsistent conclusions. For the Eleventh Circuit, the boycott was tantamount to
an illegal and constitutionally unprotected labor picket.7 For
the D.C. Circuit, however, the activity was a protected form of
expression that could not be deemed illicitly coercive.8 Beyond
the narrow confines of the dispute, this division encapsulates
the vacillating history of judicial approaches to secondary labor
boycotts. Specifically, it reflects two issues that have persistently plagued courts: how do we understand the ban on secondary coercion, and how does this understanding comport
with free speech guarantees?
Once accorded full First Amendment protection,9 peaceful
secondary labor picketing is now subject to virtual, if not absolute, prohibition.10 Conversely, “public issue” picketing has received robust constitutional protection as an exalted exercise of
political speech.11 Although several justifications have been
given for the disparity in treatment, none adequately account
for the selective exclusion of labor picketing. In a subtle and
possibly inadvertent way, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged the
indefensibility of affording labor protests diminished constitutional protection.12 Taking these latent insights as a focal point,
this Note argues that the constitutional asymmetry between
labor and political speech, especially with regard to picketing,
amounts to impermissible content-based regulation. To avoid
this quandary, this Note proposes a new methodology for inter6. See Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 438–39; Kentov, 418
F.3d at 1263–64.
7. Kentov, 418 F.3d at 1265–66.
8. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 439.
9. See Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 325–26 (1941) (“A
state cannot exclude workingmen from peacefully exercising the right of free
communication . . . .”); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103–05 (1940)
(“[T]he State in dealing with the evils arising from industrial disputes may
[not] impair the effective exercise of the right to discuss freely industrial relations which are matters of public concern.”).
10. See, e.g., Kentov, 418 F.3d at 1265 (noting the “longstanding Supreme
Court precedent” that secondary labor picketing can be prohibited “without
implicating the First Amendment”).
11. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 909–11, 913–15
(1982) (“This Court has recognized that expression on public issues ‘has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.’”
(quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980))).
12. See Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 436–39 (conceding
that a secondary labor boycott must be evaluated in a manner consistent with
general First Amendment principles and precedent).
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preting the ban on secondary coercion to ensure that labor protests are not subject to unwarranted, disproportionate, and ultimately unconstitutional restriction.
Part I of this Note examines the historical treatment of labor picketing under both the First Amendment and the NLRA,
the emergence of a constitutional double standard between labor and political protests, and the conflicting judicial approaches to the concept of coercion. Part II discusses the radical import of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Sheet Metal Workers’
International Ass’n, Local 15 v. NLRB,13 why it may herald a
significant change in the protection and analysis of labor
speech, and why it should be followed regardless of any speculative historical impact. Part III then proposes a new methodology for interpreting coercion to ensure that it remains within
First Amendment bounds. To this end, this Note advocates an
objective reasonable person test, limited by a principle of formal equality between labor and political protests, to determine
whether labor picketing is truly coercive and, thus, subject to
constitutional interdiction.
I. CYCLES AND RUPTURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF SECONDARY LABOR BOYCOTTS
A. SECONDARY LABOR BOYCOTTS AND THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT
Labor protests are conventionally categorized into two general types: primary boycotts and secondary boycotts.14 As a definitional matter, both species of dissent entail the withholding
of social or economic relations to express disfavor or exert economic pressure.15 Implementing these measures may involve
an array of tactics, including picketing, speech, dissemination
of literature, or a combination thereof.16 What differentiates
13. See id.
14. See, e.g., JOHN W. WHITEHEAD, THE RIGHT TO PICKET AND THE FREEDOM OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE 140–41 n.24 (1984) (defining primary and secondary boycotts).
15. See BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, INC., THE LABOR REFORM LAW 84
(1959) [hereinafter LABOR REFORM LAW] (defining boycott as a refusal to deal
with or patronize a business); Brian K. Beard, Comment, Secondary Boycotts
After DeBartolo: Has the Supreme Court Handed Unions a Powerful New
Weapon?, 75 IOWA L. REV. 217, 218 (1989) (defining boycott as a “withholding
of business relations by expressing disapproval or by coercion”).
16. Barbara J. Anderson, Comment, Secondary Boycotts and the First
Amendment, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 811, 814 (1984).
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the two types of protest, however, is the immediate target or
site of the advocacy. In a primary boycott, pressure is directly
applied to an employer or business with whom there is a principal labor dispute.17 In a secondary boycott, however, pressure
is brought to bear on a “neutral” party with the aim of inducing
alliance against the primary target—typically through the severance of business relations.18 Under the rubric of secondary
boycotts, a union may directly apply pressure to a neutral or
secondary business, it may urge a secondary’s employees to restrict their labor, or it may seek to influence consumers to curtail their patronage of a secondary business.19 The latter form
of protest is commonly referred to as a secondary consumer
boycott.20
Secondary labor activity is regulated under the provisions
of the NLRA.21 Specifically, section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) makes it an
unfair labor practice for unions “to threaten, coerce, or restrain
any person” with the object of compelling that person “to cease
doing business with any other person.”22 As the statutory text
indicates, section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) does not categorically proscribe
all labor boycotts.23 Rather, it regulates the means through

17. WHITEHEAD, supra note 14, at 140–41 n.24; Anderson, supra note 16,
at 813.
18. 48A AM. JUR. 2D Labor and Labor Relations § 1768 (2005); James Atleson, The Voyage of the Neptune Jade: The Perils and Promises of Transnational Labor Solidarity, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 85, 96 (2004). The paradigmatic example of a secondary boycott is when a union with a dispute against A
pressures A indirectly by targeting its clients, suppliers, or other affiliates. Richard A. Bock, Secondary Boycotts: Understanding NLRB Interpretation of
Section 8(b)(4)(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 905, 908 (2005).
19. Anderson, supra note 16, at 813–14; see also Atleson, supra note 18, at
141 (noting the distinction between secondary activities aimed at consumers
and those aimed at secondary employees).
20. Atleson, supra note 18, at 96, 141 (distinguishing between a secondary
labor boycott and a secondary consumer boycott); Note, Labor Picketing and
Commercial Speech: Free Enterprise Values in the Doctrine of Free Speech, 91
YALE L.J. 938, 938 n.2 (1982) (defining a secondary consumer boycott as “inform[ing] consumers of a strike or other labor dispute involving the employees
of the picketed business”).
21. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2000).
22. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(B).
23. See id. (prohibiting threatening or coercive labor activity); see also
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council
(DeBartolo II ), 485 U.S. 568, 578 (1988) (arguing that a violation of NLRA section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) requires a showing of threats, restraints, or coercion).
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which such measures may be effectuated.24 Two limiting provisos are relevant in this regard. First, the provision expressly
excludes primary picketing from its ambit.25 Second, the provision does not encompass “publicity, other than picketing” for
apprising the public of the existence of a producer-distributor
relationship between primary and secondary parties.26
In interpreting the “vague” and “nonspecific” language of
the secondary boycott provision,27 courts have encountered two
intertwined difficulties. First, they have struggled to determine
when a secondary boycott is coercive and, thus, prohibited under the NLRA.28 Second, courts have grappled with the constitutional implications of designating certain activities unlawfully coercive. In recent times, the attempt to answer this question
has engendered divergent levels of constitutional protection for
labor and nonlabor speech, particularly with regard to picketing. This two-tiered constitutional approach, however, has not
always predominated.
1. From Illegality to Constitutional Protection: An Early
History of Labor Boycotts
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
secondary labor boycotts were per se illegal and, thus, unprotected from governmental encroachment.29 The common law
view of illegality rested upon the presumption that secondary
pressure was inherently and categorically coercive.30 According24. Anderson, supra note 16, at 819; Tzvi Mackson-Landsberg, Note, Is a
Giant Inflatable Rat an Unlawful Secondary Picket Under Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act?, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1519,
1532 (2006).
25. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (“[N]othing contained in this clause (B)
shall be construed to make unlawful . . . any primary strike or primary picketing . . . .”).
26. Id. § 158(b)(4) (“[N]othing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully
advising the public . . . that a product or products are produced by an employer
with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed
by another employer . . . .”).
27. See DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 578 (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. See, e.g., Kate L. Rakoczy, Comment, On Mock Funerals, Banners, and
Giant Rat Balloons: Why Current Interpretation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the
National Labor Relations Act Unconstitutionally Burdens Union Speech, 56
AM. U. L. REV. 1621, 1629–30 (2007) (observing the difficulties that courts
have encountered in articulating the concept of coercion).
29. See WHITEHEAD, supra note 14, at 69; Mackson-Landsberg, supra note
24, at 1527.
30. WHITEHEAD, supra note 14, at 70–71; see Beard, supra note 15, at
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ly, all picketing, no matter how innocuous, was considered intimidating, unruly, and especially prone to violence.31
The common law conception of secondary pressure gradually eroded as courts began to distinguish boycotts as means of
placid persuasion from boycotts as crusades of intimidation.32
Simultaneously, legislative enactments also began to acknowledge the legitimacy of secondary boycotts.33 It would, however,
take nearly a decade before labor boycotts would receive salient
constitutional protection.
Constitutional protection was first extended to peaceful labor picketing in 1940.34 In Thornhill v. Alabama, the Supreme
Court invalidated a state antipicketing statute on First
Amendment grounds,35 proclaiming that “labor relations are
not matters of mere local or private concern” and “must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed
by the Constitution.”36 In so doing, the Court rejected the common law conceit that violence was a necessary concomitant of
picketing.37 Moreover, the Court repudiated any suggestion
that picketing was not entitled to First Amendment protection
because it might induce action inconsistent with the economic
interests of a targeted business.38 Since “[e]very expression of
opinion” on important matters of public concern may potentially incite “action in the interests of one rather than another” social group, the Court concluded that those in power could not
penalize peaceful discussion “merely on a showing that others
218–19.
31. WHITEHEAD, supra note 14, at 70–71; Mackson-Landsberg, supra note
24, at 1527. Under traditional common law, the idea of peaceful picketing was
considered as absurdly improbable as “‘chaste vulgarity.’” Edgar A. Jones, Jr.,
Picketing and Coercion: A Jurisprudence of Epithets, 39 VA. L. REV. 1023, 1024
(1953).
32. WHITEHEAD, supra note 14, at 71.
33. For example, in 1932 Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act effectively halting the use of injunctive relief to quell union activity, including
secondary boycotts. See Bock, supra note 18, at 910; Jeff Vlasek, Note, Hold up
the Sign and Lie Like a Rug: How Secondary Boycotts Received Another Lease
on Life, 32 J. CORP. L. 179, 182 (2006).
34. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101–02 (1940); WHITEHEAD,
supra note 14, at 72–73.
35. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 91–92, 101, 106.
36. Id. at 102–03.
37. See id. at 105 (“[N]o clear and present danger of destruction of life or
property . . . or breach of the peace can be thought to be inherent in the activities of every person who approaches the premises of an employer and publicizes the facts of a labor dispute . . . .”).
38. See id. at 103–04.
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may thereby be persuaded to take action inconsistent with
[their] interests.”39
Thus, rather than focusing its inquiry on the effect of the
protected activity on a picketed employer, the Court focused on
the relationship between the union as speaker and its intended
audience—targeted workers or consumers. Based on the foregoing, the Court stated that labor picketing could only be regulated where a “clear danger of substantive evils arises under
circumstances affording no opportunity to test the merits of
ideas ”40
Although Thornhill ultimately confronted a primary picket,41 subsequent Supreme Court decisions upheld and expanded
First Amendment protection to secondary labor picketing. In
American Federation of Labor v. Swing, the Court held that a
state could not enjoin a union picket on the grounds that there
was no immediate employer-employee relationship between the
boycotters and their target.42 The Court also reaffirmed the
precept that picketing may not be restricted simply because it
might engender fiscal harm or loss of patronage.43 Likewise, in
Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, the Supreme Court held that constitutional protection for peaceful
picketing is not lost merely because the immediate targets of a
protest are secondary suppliers or customers of a primary employer.44
Wohl would, however, presage a retreat from the expansive
constitutional protection lavished upon labor picketing. In a
concurring opinion, Justice William Douglas seminally charac39. Id. at 104.
40. Id. at 104–05. The Court was invoking Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes’s famous formulation of the clear and present danger test for determining when speech is constitutionally unprotected. See Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
41. Since Thornhill and his compatriots were picketing their own employer—the entity with whom they had a dispute—the boycott was clearly primary. See Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 94. Regardless, the Court’s emphasis on the public importance of labor speech suggests an expansive principle encompassing
secondary picketing as well. Id. at 102–03.
42. 312 U.S. 321, 325–26 (1941) (“A state cannot exclude workingmen
from peacefully exercising the right of free communication by drawing the circle of economic competition between employers and workers so small as to contain only an employer and those directly employed by him.”).
43. Id. at 326 (“Communication by such employees of the facts of a dispute, deemed by them to be relevant to their interests, [cannot] be barred because of concern for the economic interests against which they are seeking to
enlist [the] public . . . .”).
44. 315 U.S. 769, 772–75 (1942).
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terized picketing as an instance of “speech-plus,”45 or an amalgam of speech and nonspeech elements.46 For Douglas, it was
precisely the nonspeech elements of picketing (i.e., patrolling)
that could justify restriction.47
Less than a decade after Thornhill’s declaration that picketing was a form of protected speech involving matters of public
concern, however, courts and legislatures were granted substantial latitude in regulating labor picketing.48 The retraction
would reach its apogee with the inclusion of an anti-secondary
boycott provision in the NLRA.49
2. Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin: Circumscribing
Secondary Boycotts
First enacted in 1935,50 the NLRA—commonly known as
the Wagner Act51—contained a sweeping enunciation of employee rights without corresponding strictures on union activity.52 In 1947, amidst a wave of antiunion sentiment, Congress
45. Activity that combines speech and nonspeech elements has been
termed “‘speech-plus,’” which is used to distinguish it from “‘pure speech.’” See
WHITEHEAD, supra note 14, at 73–75 (emphasis omitted); Atleson, supra note
18, at 143–44 n.179. The “‘plus’” refers to the conduct element of the activity
that may trigger a response independent of the ideas conveyed. WHITEHEAD,
supra note 14, at 75 (emphasis omitted).
46. See Wohl, 315 U.S. at 776–77 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“Picketing by
an organized group is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action
. . . irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated.”).
47. Id. Nevertheless, Douglas ultimately maintained the propriety of robust protection for labor speech. Id. at 777. Somewhat ironically, his remarks
would later be invoked to curtail this very right. See NLRB v. Retail Store
Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (invoking the speech-conduct distinction to justify barring labor
picketing consistent with the First Amendment).
48. See LABOR REFORM LAW, supra note 15, at 99 (noting the pronounced
Supreme Court departure from Thornhill within fifteen years); Julius Getman, Labor Law and Free Speech: The Curious Policy of Limited Expression,
43 MD. L. REV. 4, 12–16 (1984) (describing how post-Thornhill decisions reflected a steady retreat from the notion of picketing as a form of protected
speech); Note, supra note 20, at 941–43 (noting that within a decade of Thornhill an extremely lenient constitutional standard for picketing restrictions was
adopted).
49. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2000).
50. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2000)).
51. Julius Getman, The National Labor Relations Act: What Went Wrong;
Can We Fix It?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 125, 146 n.3 (2003).
52. See Bock, supra note 18, at 912–13 (discussing how the NLRA did not
include unfair labor practices by unions until it was amended in 1947); Get-
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amended the Act to prohibit unfair labor practices.53 Section
8(b)(4)(A) of the Taft-Hartley Act, the precursor to the current
secondary boycott provision, made it unlawful for a union to
“encourage the employees of any employer” to strike with the
aim of forcing that employer to terminate business dealings
with another.54 Although the term “secondary boycott” did not
appear in the provision,55 legislative history clearly indicates
an intent to prevent “wholly unconcerned” parties from becoming ensnared in labor disputes not of their own making.56
Notwithstanding the congressional purpose underlying section 8(b)(4), the statutory language proved inept at circumscribing union activity directed at neutral parties.57 For example,
since the prohibition was confined to inducements directed at
“employees,” it left unions free to apply pressure directly upon
secondary employers or their customers.58 To eliminate this
and other perceived loopholes,59 Congress passed the LandrumGriffin Act in 1959.60
One major change wrought by the Landrum-Griffin Act
was the addition of section 8(b)(4)(ii), which made it an unfair
labor practice “to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person” with
the object of compelling that person to cease doing business
with any other.61 The added provision facially reached both
man, supra note 51, at 125–26 (observing that the Wagner Act contained an
expansive articulation of employee rights).
53. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101,
tit. I, sec. 101, § 8(b)(4)(A), 61 Stat. 136, 141 (1947) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2000)); see Bock, supra note 18, at 912–13; Vlasek, supra
note 33, at 183.
54. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(b)(4)(A).
55. See id.
56. See, e.g., 93 CONG. REC. 4182, 4198 (1947) (statement of Sen. Taft)
(“This provision makes it unlawful to resort to a secondary boycott to injure
the business of a third person who is wholly unconcerned in the disagreement
between an employer and his employees.”).
57. See LABOR RELATIONS & LEGAL DEP’T, CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, LABOR REFORM LAW 1959: THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT
30–31 (1960); see also NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen,
Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 64 – 65 (1964) (detailing the numerous
loopholes that became apparent in the Taft-Hartley Act).
58. E.g., Bock, supra note 18, at 913–14.
59. LABOR REFORM LAW, supra note 15, at 85–88; Bock, supra note 18, at
913–16.
60. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No.
86-257, tit. VII, section 704, 73 Stat. 519, 542–43 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2000)).
61. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 8(b)(4)(ii);
see LABOR REFORM LAW, supra note 15, at 9.
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secondary employers and their patrons and tightened the ban
on secondary boycotts by prohibiting consumer picketing at retail sites distributing goods produced by a manufacturer with
whom the union has a dispute.62
Although the expansive language of section 8(b)(4)(ii) effectively closed the Taft-Hartley loopholes, some found its sheer
breadth disquieting.63 Due to concerns that a broad ban on labor publicity would encroach upon otherwise legitimate and
constitutionally protected activity, the Act was adopted with
two clarifications.64 First, a clause was inserted to safeguard
the legality of primary picketing.65 Second, the Act’s scope was
limited by a “publicity proviso”66 protecting informational activity, other than picketing, for advertising the existence of a producer-distributor relationship between a primary employer and
a secondary business.67 In an oft-quoted statement explaining
the import of the publicity proviso, Senator Edward Kennedy
declared that unions could “carry on all publicity short of having ambulatory picketing in front of a secondary site.”68
3. Secondary Labor Picketing in the Wake of Landrum-Griffin
The Supreme Court did not address the NLRA’s antiboycott provision until 1964.69 In NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits), a union struck
fruit pacing companies that sold Washington state apples to
Safeway supermarkets.70 To further the strike, the union instituted secondary pickets outside several Safeway stores to persuade patrons not to consume the “struck” product. Although
union members marched before customer entrances, they did
not impede deliveries or obstruct the ingress of patrons.71 The
62. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4); see also LABOR REFORM LAW, supra note 15,
at 9.
63. See 105 CONG. REC. 17,818, 17,898–99 (1959) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (arguing that the provision would curtail legitimate activity); id. at
6231–32 (statement of Sen. Humphrey) (voicing concerns that the secondary
boycott provision would invade free speech guarantees).
64. LABOR REFORM LAW, supra note 15, at 85.
65. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B).
66. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760
(Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 69 (1964) (discussing the publicity proviso).
67. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4); see also Anderson, supra note 16, at 819 (discussing the two statutory provisos).
68. 105 CONG. REC. 17,899 (1959) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
69. Mackson-Landsberg, supra note 24, at 1531.
70. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 59–60.
71. Id. at 60–61.
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Court was charged with determining whether the activity was
coercive under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).72
Concerned that a “broad ban against peaceful picketing”
might conflict with free speech guarantees, the Court demanded a clear legislative intent to prohibit the type of picketing at issue.73 Scrutinizing the statutory language and legislative history of Landrum-Griffin, the Court rejected the view
that Congress intended to prohibit all secondary picketing, particularly when limited to persuading patrons not to purchase a
struck product.74 Consequently, the Court drew a polar distinction between picketing aimed at a struck product and picketing
exhorting a total cessation of patronage.75 With regard to the
former, the Court held such picketing to be noncoercive.76
Echoing Thornhill,77 it rejected the claim that coercion was a
function of economic loss incurred by a secondary business.78
Although the Court’s analysis was framed by constitutional
concerns, the constitutional legacy of Tree Fruits is indeterminate. Because the majority found the picketing noncoercive,
they failed to address the First Amendment issue.79 In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Hugo Black confronted the
constitutional question, declaring the statutory provision
invalid.80 For Black, not only was the provision an unconstitutional abridgement of protected speech,81 but it was also an impermissible content-based restriction that only banned picketing “when the picketers express particular views.”82
Black’s First Amendment apprehensions were addressed
sixteen years later in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union,
Local 1001 (Safeco).83 In Safeco, a union embroiled in a dispute
against an insurance underwriter peacefully picketed several
title companies that derived over ninety percent of their revenue from the “struck” firm’s policies.84 Holding the boycott to be
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See id. at 59.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 63–69, 71–73.
Id. at 63–64.
Id. at 71–72.
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103–05 (1940).
Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 72–73.
See id. at 63–73.
Id. at 76 (Black, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 79.
447 U.S. 607 (1980).
Id. at 609–10.
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coercive in violation of the NLRA,85 the Court blurred the
sharply delineated distinction drawn in Tree Fruits between
picketing a struck product and picketing calculated to induce a
general loss of patronage.86
Distinguishing Tree Fruits, where the struck product was
one of many sold,87 Safeco held that secondary picketing directed solely at a struck product nonetheless violates section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) where it threatens a neutral party with “ruin or
substantial loss.”88 Additionally, the decision modified the analytical framework for construing the concept of coercion. Although there was no suggestion that patrons were coerced into
capitulating to union demands, the Court evinced little regard
for the effect on the immediate recipients of the message.89 Rather, the Court exclusively focused on the potential fiscal harm
attending a secondary business.90
Upon finding the picketing coercive, the Court held that
the secondary picketing ban did not impermissibly restrict a
union’s right to free speech.91 While the plurality summarily
dispensed with the issue,92 Justices Harry Blackmun and John
Paul Stevens adduced more substantive rationales for the legislative interdiction. Cognizant of the constitutional concerns
raised by Justice Black in Tree Fruits, Blackmun admonished
the plurality for failing to consider whether the “content-based
ban” was constitutional.93 Despite his reproach, Blackmun reluctantly deemed the regulation permissible as an instance of
Congress “striking [a] delicate balance between union freedom
of expression and the ability of neutral [parties] . . . to remain
free from coerced participation in industrial strife.”94
Unlike Blackmun’s special balancing rationale, Justice
Stevens advanced a “speech-plus” argument redolent of Wil85. Id. at 614 –15.
86. See Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 63–64.
87. Id. at 60.
88. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 614 –15.
89. See id.
90. See id. (holding that product picketing that can be expected to threaten neutral parties with significant financial loss “plainly violates the statutory
ban on the coercion of neutrals”).
91. Id. at 616.
92. The plurality’s First Amendment analysis was essentially limited to
the following laconic observation: “As applied to picketing that predictably encourages consumers to boycott a secondary business, § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) imposes no
impermissible restrictions upon constitutionally protected speech.” Id. at 616.
93. See id. at 616–17 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 617–18.
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liam Douglas’s concurrence in Wohl.95 Over a decade before Safeco, the Court dismissed the proposition that the First
Amendment bestows “the same kind of freedom to those who
would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing” as it affords “those who communicate ideas
by pure speech.”96 Invoking this speech-conduct dichotomy,
Stevens opined that “[i]n the labor context, it is the conduct
element rather than the particular idea being expressed that
often provides the most persuasive deterrent to third persons
about to enter a business establishment.”97 On this basis, Stevens found the statutory ban permissible because it affected
“that aspect of the union’s efforts to communicate its views that
calls for an automatic response to a signal, rather than a reasoned response to an idea.”98 Under the speech-plus doctrine,
then, labor protests lose their First Amendment protection
when they persuade by force of conduct rather than cogency of
ideas. However, under Stevens’s formulation, labor picketing,
by triggering a reflexive response, always appears to fall outside constitutional preserves.99 In the end, it was these concurrences that would provide enduring justifications for constitutionally barring labor picketing.100
4. Antidiscrimination Picketing and the Rise of a First
Amendment Double Standard
In 1972, a paladin for racial equality in public education
challenged the constitutionality of an ordinance banning all but
labor picketing outside public schools.101 In Police Department
of Chicago v. Mosley, the Supreme Court held that the ordinance violated First Amendment guarantees because it drew “an
impermissible distinction between labor picketing and other
peaceful picketing.”102 For the Mosley Court, not only was pick95. See id. at 618–19 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that picketing is a
mixture of both speech and conduct).
96. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965).
97. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring).
98. Id.
99. See id. (indicating that in the labor context, picketing calls for an automatic response and, thus, is not protected speech).
100. See, e.g., Overstreet v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am.,
Local Union No. 1506, 409 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2005) (observing that
Justice Steven’s Safeco concurrence provided the justification for prohibiting
picketing within constitutional bounds that a Supreme Court majority would
eventually adopt).
101. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 93–94 (1972).
102. Id. at 94.
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eting a form of constitutionally protected communication,103 but
the First Amendment demanded that government not restrict
expression because of its content.104 Accordingly, the Court established that content-based restrictions on protected speech,
including picketing, were constitutionally impermissible.105
On the same day the Safeco decision was rendered,106 the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the content-based principle articulated in Mosley.107 In Carey v. Brown, the Court invalidated an
ordinance proscribing all picketing, except for labor picketing,
as a violation of the First Amendment.108 As in Mosley, the
Court found that the ordinance illegitimately discriminated
amongst protected speech on the basis of content.109 Rejecting
the government’s claim that labor picketing was more deserving of constitutional protection than “public protests over other
issues,” the Court declared that public-issue picketing “has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values.”110 In a somewhat incongruous turn, however, the Court transcended the bare assertion that contentbased discriminations are invalid. Rather, the Court insinuated
that public-issue picketing is more deserving of constitutional
protection than labor picketing.111
The distinction between public and private picketing first
articulated in Carey was fully explicated and endorsed in

103. Id. at 95.
104. Id. at 95–96.
105. See id. at 96 (“[G]overnment may not grant the use of a forum to
people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.”).
106. Both Safeco and Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980), were decided on
June 20, 1980. Compare NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001
(Safeco), 447 U.S. 607 (1980), with Carey, 447 U.S. 455.
107. See Carey, 447 U.S. at 460, 462–63 (invoking Mosley’s content-based
principle to invalidate a residential antipicketing ordinance indistinguishable
from the former’s public forum antipicketing ordinance); see also WHITEHEAD,
supra note 14, at 89–90.
108. Carey, 447 U.S. at 461–63.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 466–67.
111. The insinuation stems from the Court’s citation to an academic tract
“suggesting that nonlabor picketing is more akin to pure expression than labor
picketing and thus should be subject to fewer restrictions.” Id. at 466 (citing
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 444 –49
(1970)); see also Beard, supra note 15, at 231 n.132 (noting the suggestion that
labor picketing is less deserving of constitutional protection than political protests).
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NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.112 Claiborne Hardware involved a civil rights boycott of white merchants to secure compliance with a litany of demands for racial equality, including
desegregation of public facilities and the hiring of black employees.113 Although primarily supported by speeches and nonviolent picketing, violence, threats, and coercive acts were used
to bolster boycott participation.114 Nevertheless, a unanimous
Court held that the nonviolent elements of the boycott, including threats of social ostracism and other “coercive” pressure,
were constitutionally protected.115 Unless the speech involved
“fighting words,” created a “clear and present danger,” or was
directed at inciting imminent lawlessness, advocacy of force did
not remove speech from the purview of the First Amendment.116 Thus, what would have been an illegal and unprotected secondary labor boycott, was accorded full protection in
the civil rights context.
Perhaps realizing the potential discrepancy in constitutional protection, the Court was quick to limit its holding to
nonlabor boycotts.117 The Court attempted to distinguish labor
and nonlabor picketing on two grounds. First, resurrecting Justice Blackmun’s special balancing rationale from Safeco,118 the
Court argued that secondary labor boycotts could be prohibited
as part of striking a delicate balance between union expression
and protecting neutral parties from “coerced participation” in
economic discord.119 Second, citing Carey, the Court announced
112. 458 U.S. 886, 913–15 (1982); see also Note, supra note 20, at 947–49
(discussing the incorporation of Carey’s public-private distinction into Court
doctrine via Claiborne Hardware).
113. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 889, 899.
114. Id. at 895, 902, 907–10.
115. Id. at 909–11.
116. Id. at 927–28 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that a state cannot forbid advocacy of illegal action except where it is directed at inciting imminent lawlessness and is likely to produce such a result); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (establishing that “fighting words”—
words that provoke imminent violence—are not constitutionally protected (internal quotation marks omitted)); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919) (proclaiming that words that “create a clear and present danger” are
not constitutionally protected). The Claiborne Hardware Court explicitly relied
on these cases in determining whether the boycott activity was constitutionally protected. See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 927–28.
117. See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 912–13.
118. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S.
607, 617–18 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
119. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 912.
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a constitutionally relevant distinction between labor and public-issue speech.120 Whereas the former was emblematic of “parochial economic interests,” the latter was “essential political
speech lying at the core of the First Amendment.”121 Claiborne
Hardware thus indicated that labor picketing should be regarded as a form of commercial speech122 meriting less constitutional protection than political speech.123
Claiborne Hardware’s significance, however, exceeds the
tenet that labor boycotts merit diminished protection because
they do not involve fundamental public concerns. The Court’s
decision also differed significantly from its erstwhile analysis of
labor boycotts. In contrast to Safeco, coercion was not treated
with respect to the boycotted merchants;124 rather, it was a
function of the relationship between the boycott advocates and
their intended audience.125 Additionally, the Court rejected any
claim that the occurrence of violence was sufficient to condemn
the entire boycott unless “fear rather than protected conduct
was the dominant force” behind the enterprise.126
Interestingly, the political/commercial distinction employed
in Claiborne Hardware127 had been nearly eviscerated several
months earlier. In International Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied
International, Inc., a union refused to handle cargo arriving
from or destined for the Soviet Union in protest of the Russian
invasion of Afghanistan.128 The labor abstention, which was
unaccompanied by picketing, significantly disrupted the busi120. Id. at 913 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)).
121. Id. at 915 (quoting Henry v. First Nat’l Bank of Clarksdale, 595 F.2d
291, 303 (5th Cir. 1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
122. See id. at 912–13. Commercial speech has been defined as speech that
merely “‘propose[s] a commercial transaction,’” Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973)), or speech “related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and
its audience,” Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). Its paradigmatic example is “advertising the price of
a product or arguing its merits.” Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (DeBartolo II ), 485 U.S. 568, 576 (1988).
123. See, e.g., Beard, supra note 15, at 232.
124. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S.
607, 614 –15 (1980).
125. See Getman, supra note 48, at 18 (explaining how Claiborne Hardware’s conception of coercion, which refers to the manner in which people are
enlisted, differs from the concept as employed in labor boycott cases).
126. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 933–34.
127. Id. at 913–15.
128. 456 U.S. 212, 214 (1982).
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ness of a domestic importer.129 Although the importer’s complaint was initially dismissed as a primary and political boycott
beyond the ambit of section 8(b)(4),130 the Court found no exception for politically based disputes with foreign nations.131
Because “[t]he distinction between labor and political objectives
would be difficult to draw in many cases,” the Court refused to
create a political exemption from the secondary boycott ban.132
Thus, despite the union’s “understandable and even commendable” objective, its actions placed a heavy burden on neutral
businesses and, accordingly, could be restrained.133
Moreover, in its most spartan First Amendment analysis to
date, the Court distilled an epoch of labor jurisprudence into
one terse proclamation: “We have consistently rejected the
claim that secondary picketing by labor unions in violation of
section 8(b)(4) is protected activity under the First Amendment.”134 The withholding of labor, without even a trace of
picketing, was thus treated as “conduct designed not to communicate but to coerce.”135 With these perfunctory remarks, the
status of secondary labor boycotts appeared to revert to its
common law roots. Not only were they inherently coercive, but
the sole criterion of coercion lay in the economic effects attending a targeted business.
5. DeBartolo II and Its Progeny: Eroding the Free Speech
Double Standard
In Safeco, the Supreme Court “left no doubt that Congress
may prohibit secondary picketing” directed at consumers.136 It
did, however, leave open the question of whether a boycott advanced through other means could be prohibited.137 The ques129. Id. at 214 –16.
130. Id. at 217.
131. See id. at 223–25.
132. Id. at 225–26.
133. Id. at 223.
134. Id. at 226.
135. Id.
136. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S.
607, 616 (1980).
137. Safeco merely addressed the status of secondary picketing under the
NLRA and the First Amendment. See id. at 610, 614 –16. The Court did not
tackle the question of whether Congress had, or could have prohibited other
means of appealing to secondary consumers. See id. at 610 n.3 (“The distribution of handbills has not been an issue in this case.”); see also Sheet Metal
Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, Local 15 v. NLRB, 491 F.3d 429, 437 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (observing that Safeco “had not spoken to the question” of whether Congress
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tion was resolved in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf
Coast Building & Construction Trades Council (DeBartolo II ),
which held that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) does not reach peaceful
handbilling unaccompanied by picketing or patrolling.138
In DeBartolo II, a union dispensed handbills outside mall
entrances to protest the retention of a construction contractor
by one of the mall’s tenants.139 Although the union’s dispute
was with the construction company over substandard wages, it
urged a consumer boycott of all mall stores until the mall owner vowed to only use contractors paying fair wages.140 The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) deemed the handbilling a
form of illicit economic coercion, but the Court disagreed.141
In the Court’s view, the NLRB’s interpretation raised
grave constitutional concerns.142 On the one hand, peaceful
handbilling urging a “wholly legal course of action” was expressive activity.143 On the other hand, the Court abandoned the
conclusion that labor communications were necessarily a form
of commercial speech meriting diminished constitutional protection.144 Rather, the handbills at issue, “press[ing] the benefits of unionism to the community and the dangers of inadequate wages to the economy,” were more than typical
commercial speech advertising product prices or quality.145 Assessing coercion from a consumer perspective, the Court found
that “[t]he loss of customers because they read a handbill urging them not to patronize a business, and not because they are
intimidated by a line of picketers, is the result of mere persuasion.”146 On this basis, the Court held that the handbilling, bereft of picketing, was not coercive under the secondary boycott
ban.147 The Court also found support for this decision in Senacould have prohibited “other means of appealing to the customers of the secondary employer”).
138. 485 U.S. 568, 588 (1988).
139. Id. at 570–71.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 572–74.
142. Id. at 574 –77.
143. Id. at 575–76.
144. See id. at 576 (“We do not suggest that communications by labor unions are never of the commercial speech variety and thereby entitled to a lesser degree of constitutional protection.”). Although the sentiment was cast in
negative terms, the Court’s assertion implies that labor communications are
not categorically commercial.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 580.
147. Id. at 588.
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tor Kennedy’s illustrious statement that unions could engage in
informational activity “short of . . . ambulatory picketing.”148
For the Court, this remark indicated that the only activity
Congress clearly intended to proscribe was ambulatory picketing.149
As in Tree Fruits,150 the Court obviated the First Amendment question by construing the provision as not reaching the
challenged activity.151 Nevertheless, the opinion does suggest
that, if the Court were forced to decide the issue, it would have
protected the handbilling as political speech.152 In this, and
other respects, DeBartolo II seemed to revive the principles articulated in Thornhill.153 By repudiating the notion that labor
speech is inherently commercial, by shifting the coercion analysis back to the impact on the direct recipients of speech, and by
reinstating the idea that not every secondary boycotts is ipso
facto coercive,154 the decision seemed to herald a return to a bygone era.
That is, however, except for its manifest ambivalence towards picketing. While the Court dismissed the notion that
“any kind of handbilling, picketing, or other appeal[]” is coercive,155 it also embraced Justice Stevens’s Safeco postulate that
“picketing is qualitatively different” than handbilling because it
is “a mixture of conduct and communication” and, thus, subject
to restrictive regulation.156 Due to this seeming inconsistency,
commentators have split over whether the case exempts all labor picketing from constitutional protection or merely coercive
148. Id. at 587 (quoting 105 CONG. REC. 17,818, 17,899 (1959) (statement
of Sen. Kennedy)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. See id. at 582–84, 588.
150. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760
(Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 63–73 (1964) (failing to address the First Amendment issue because the Court found that the picketing was noncoercive).
151. See DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 578 (declaring that the statutory construction obviates the need to decide whether a prohibition on handbilling
would violate the First Amendment).
152. See id. at 576 (refusing to relegate handbilling to the status of mere
commercial speech).
153. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103–05 (1940) (holding that the
relevant inquiry is the relationship between the union and the intended listeners).
154. DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 576, 580, 588.
155. Id. at 579–80 (emphasis added).
156. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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picketing.157 Thus, DeBartolo II raised the question of whether
the germane distinction is between picketing and nonpicketing,
or between persuasion and coercion.
B. SHEET METAL WORKERS’ INTERNATIONAL ASS’N
In the wake of DeBartolo II, courts have largely adopted
the picketing/nonpicketing distinction as the key criterion for
appraising the legality of secondary labor boycotts.158 As such,
decisions often hinge on labeling.159 Where a union can cogently
analogize an activity to handbilling, it will be deemed permissible; where it can be characterized as tantamount to picketing,
it can be enjoined without concern.160 Regardless of result, the
picketing test ultimately perpetuates the constitutional differential so vividly illustrated in Claiborne Hardware. As long as
secondary labor picketing is absolutely prohibited under the
NLRA, labor speech will continue to occupy a subaltern space
in the sphere of public protests. A potentially radical reconsideration of this view may be underway.
1. A Divisive Mock Funeral
On March 15, 2004, union members staged a mock funeral
procession outside a medical center in Brandon, Florida.161 As
four “pallbearers” carried an ersatz coffin, one union member
donned a grotesquely large Grim Reaper costume complete
with a plastic scythe.162 Over the course of two hours, the
“mourners,” accompanied by somber funeral dirges, intermittently traversed a loop one hundred feet from the hospital entrance.163 Concurrently, several other union members distributed leaflets entitled “Going to Brandon Hospital Should Not
Be a Grave Decision,” accurately detailing malpractice suits
pending against the hospital.164 Despite the theatrics, the pro-

157. See, e.g., Mackson-Landsberg, supra note 24, at 1540–54 (detailing the
divergent and conflicting interpretations of DeBartolo II ).
158. See id. at 1522–23.
159. Id. at 1523.
160. Id.
161. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, Local 15 v. NLRB, 491 F.3d 429,
431–32 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Kentov v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n Local 15,
418 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 2005).
162. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 432; Kentov, 418 F.3d at
1261, 1265 (internal quotation marks omitted).
163. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 432–33.
164. Id. at 432 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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cession was orderly and unobtrusive.165 The marchers did not
interfere with pedestrian or vehicular traffic, nor did they impede the ingress of hospital patrons.166 Like all secondary boycotts, the union was not directly involved in a dispute with the
hospital.167 Its primary targets were a staffing agency and contractor employing nonunion labor for a hospital construction
project.168 The union hoped that by pressuring hospital patrons
it would induce the hospital to terminate its relationship with
the subcontractors.169
2. The Eleventh Circuit’s Approach
Two days after the procession, the hospital filed a complaint with the NLRB.170 While pending before an administrative law judge (ALJ), the regional director for the NLRB sought
an interim injunction against the activity.171 Although the district court found the procession orderly and placid, it issued a
temporary injunction barring the union from picketing and
“staging street theater.”172
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
upheld the injunction.173 Construing DeBartolo II as reaffirming the longstanding principle that secondary labor picketing
can be regulated without implicating the First Amendment, the
court attempted to determine whether the procession was closer to unlawful picketing or lawful handbilling.174 Ultimately,
the court concluded that there was reasonable cause to believe
that the funeral procession was the “functional equivalent” of
picketing and, thus, could be constitutionally enjoined under
the NLRA.175 The court based this assessment on the finding
that the union’s activity was calculated to induce the hospital
to sever business relations and, moreover, that it could be expected to dissuade patronage.176

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 433.
Id.; Kentov, 418 F.3d at 1261–62.
Kentov, 418 F.3d at 1261.
Id.
Id. at 1263, 1266.
Id. at 1262.
Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 433.
Kentov, 418 F.3d at 1261–62, 1262 n.4.
Id. at 1267.
Id. at 1264 –65.
Id. at 1265–66.
Id.
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3. The District of Columbia Circuit’s Approach
Around the time of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, the ALJ
concluded that the union violated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) because
the procession constituted an illicit picket that forced bystanders to “cross a death march.”177 Accordingly, the NLRB ordered
the union to desist from further picketing.178
The union appealed the NLRB’s order, petitioning the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia for review.179 In
Sheet Metal Workers’ International Ass’n, Local 15 v. NLRB,
the union advanced two intertwined arguments for dissolving
the injunction. First, it argued that the procession was a form
of noncoercive expression entitled to full First Amendment protection.180 Second, it claimed that the injunction constituted a
repugnant content-based restriction on that right.181 Since the
mock funeral “could never have been prohibited if it had expressed opposition to the Hospital’s practices, environmental
policy, or any other grievance,” applying a different rule in the
labor context “would be unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.”182 Predicated on this theoretical basis, the union argued
that its activity was consistent with two recent Supreme Court
abortion protest cases and, thus, should be constitutionally protected and deemed noncoercive.183
The District of Columbia Circuit largely agreed.184 The
court rejected the claim that it should distinguish the abortion
protest cases because there is a uniquely strong governmental
interest in regulating labor picketing.185 The NLRB, relying on
Claiborne Hardware, claimed that secondary labor boycotts
177. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, Local 15 v. NLRB, 491 F.3d 429, 433
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
178. Id. at 433–34.
179. Id. at 431.
180. See id. at 436.
181. See id.
182. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
183. Id. The union relied on Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512
U.S. 753 (1994), and Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000). In Madsen, the
Court held that an injunction creating a three hundred foot buffer around an
abortion clinic was an unconstitutional burden on protestors’ First Amendment rights. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 773–74. Simultaneously, however, the Court
upheld the injunction’s thirty-six-foot buffer around clinic entrances. Id. at
770. In Hill, the Court affirmed the legitimacy of a statute declaring that,
when within one hundred feet of an abortion clinic, protestors could not come
within eight feet of their intended target. Hill, 530 U.S. at 729–30.
184. See Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 436–37.
185. Id.
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could be enjoined as part of striking a balance between union
freedom and the ability of neutral parties to “remain free from
coerced participation” in economic discord.186 The court, however, saw the proclamation as providing little guidance for construing the meaning or scope of coercion.187
The court also rejected its sister circuit’s conclusion that
the procession was the functional analog of unlawful and unprotected picketing.188 Admonishing the Eleventh Circuit for
conflating means and ends, the court noted that it was clearly
the union’s aim to dissuade patronage.189 As a mechanism for
achieving this end, however, the court found that the “combination of street theater and handbilling” lacked all the coercive
hallmarks of picketing.190 Namely, the procession was nonconfrontational and it failed to create a physical or symbolic barrier to entry.191
With the question of coercion lingering, the court conceded
that the impugned activity, as well as the concept of coercion,
must be assessed in a manner consistent with general First
Amendment jurisprudence.192 Applying the Supreme Court’s
abortion protest decisions, the court concluded that the procession was consistent with activity held to be constitutionally
protected.193 Thus, to ensure that coercion was not defined in
conflict with free speech guarantees, the court declared that
“nothing [the union] did can realistically be deemed coercive,
threatening, restraining, or intimidating.”194

186. Id.
187. See id. at 437 (“That statement . . . leaves open the question of what
constitutes ‘coerced participation’ in a labor dispute and, of course, does nothing to suggest coercion may be defined so broadly as to crimp the free speech
guarantee of the First Amendment.”).
188. See id. at 437–38.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 438.
192. Id. at 438–39.
193. Id. at 439.
194. Id.
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II. REEVALUATING CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
FOR LABOR PICKETS
A. THE LATENT AND LAUDABLE RADICALISM OF SHEET METAL
WORKERS’ INTERNATIONAL ASS’N
In many respects, Sheet Metal Workers’ International Ass’n
simply adhered to the substantive principles and methodological framework articulated in DeBartolo II. Like the Supreme
Court, the D.C. Circuit adopted a consumer-based, rather than
business-based, view of coercion195 and denounced the contention that every effort at facilitating a secondary consumer boycott is inherently coercive.196 Based on its own reading of DeBartolo II, however, the court also maintained that picketing,
unlike other secondary tactics, is categorically coercive, unlawful, and constitutionally unprotected.197
Notwithstanding the similarities, the circuit court’s opinion
does mark a relatively radical expansion on precedent—albeit
inconspicuously and inadvertently so. First, the decision augmented the range of permissible and protected union efforts to
ambulatory activity (i.e., a mock funeral procession).198 Unlike
DeBartolo II and its progeny, which declined to prohibit largely
stationary activity such as handbilling or immobile bannering,199 Sheet Metal Workers’ International Ass’n afforded protection to a fundamentally itinerant activity. Recalling Senator
Kennedy’s assertion that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) would permit
“publicity short of having ambulatory picketing,”200 the court
appears to push the permissible bounds of secondary activity
195. Compare Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council (DeBartolo II ), 485 U.S. 568, 578, 580 (1988) (assessing the coercive impact of a secondary labor boycott from the perspective of
customers), with Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 438 (assessing
the coerciveness of a labor boycott from the vantage point of potential patrons).
196. Compare DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 578–79 (arguing that it is untenable to categorically equate boycott activity with coercion), with Sheet Metal
Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 437 (arguing that not every secondary boycott
is coercive and illegal under the NLRA).
197. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 437–38.
198. See id. at 439.
199. See DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 571, 588 (refusing to prohibit union
handbilling unaccompanied by picketing or patrolling); Overstreet v. United
Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 1506, 409 F.3d 1199,
1201–02, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (refusing to enjoin “generally stationary . . .
bannering activity”).
200. 105 CONG. REC. 17,818, 17,899 (1959) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
(emphasis added).
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closer to this asserted limit. As such, it extends the gamut of
permissible forms of secondary labor activity.
Second, unlike its predecessors, Sheet Metal Workers’ International Ass’n did not exclusively nor predominately rely on
precepts and precedent from the labor context.201 Rather, the
court imported First Amendment principles from a nonlabor
and patently political context (i.e., abortion protests) to determine the categories of union activity constitutionally immune
from the NLRA’s secondary boycott ban.202 In so doing, the
court subtly—though absolutely—denied any distinction between labor and political speech, implicitly indicating that unions must possess the same First Amendment rights as other
social groups. In this respect, the decision represents a significant and radical departure from recent precedent.
As previously discussed, DeBartolo II indicated that certain forms of union communication are not commercial speech
entitled to diminished constitutional protection, particularly
where they expressly emphasize the salutary impact of unions
on the welfare of the general populace.203 Accordingly, where
union communication presses “the benefits of unionism to the
community,” then it transcends mere commercial speech.204
DeBartolo II, thus, eroded the strict equivalence between labor
and commercial speech.
While DeBartolo II eroded the nexus between labor and
commercial speech, Sheet Metal Workers’ International Ass’n
appears to completely implode the equation. By applying First
Amendment principles gleaned from a nonlabor and political
context,205 the D.C. Circuit tacitly denied the political-economic
distinction altogether as applied to labor speech. Consequently,
in contrast with DeBartolo II,206 the particular message emblazoned on a placard became immaterial to the adjudicative cal201. See DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 577–80 (relying predominately on principles set forth in Tree Fruits and Safeco); Kentov v. Sheet Metal Workers’
Int’l Ass’n Local 15, 418 F.3d 1259, 1264 –65 (11th Cir. 2005) (relying predominately on DeBartolo II and Safeco); Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1210–14 (relying
extensively on DeBartolo II and Safeco).
202. See Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 436, 438–39.
203. DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 576.
204. Id.
205. See Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 436, 438–39 (applying
abortion protest decisions to determine whether labor activity could be prohibited without violating the First Amendment).
206. See DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 578 (stating that it is necessary to determine whether the handbilling was threatening or coercive).
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culus. Finally, and again quite significantly, the court also took
the unprecedented step—at least in modern times—of acknowledging that different rules or levels of constitutional protection
for labor and political protests would constitute impermissible
viewpoint or content-based regulation.207
Paradoxically, although Sheet Metal Workers’ International
Ass’n ostensibly applied the picketing-handbilling distinction it
discerned in DeBartolo II,208 its very reasoning belies the proposition that picketing is a necessarily coercive act that can be
regulated without constitutional concern. If labor speech is political speech entitled to full constitutional protection, and if
any other standard would constitute unconstitutional contentbased regulation, then it follows that labor unions ought to receive the same level of protection for peaceful picketing afforded to other groups. The D.C. Circuit’s own analysis, then,
implies that union protestors must be accorded the same rights
to peacefully picket that were bestowed upon the civil rights
protestors in Claiborne Hardware.209 The decision thus exerts
pressure on the persistent juridical and legislative doublestandard that effectively states that anyone, except for union
members, can peacefully picket any target.
If Sheet Metal Workers International Ass’n is a harbinger of
things to come, it may herald a significant change in First
Amendment protection for labor-related activity, as well as an
expansion of permissible secondary tactics. However, even if
the opinion ultimately fails to portend a significant change, its
approach to secondary labor activity is preferable to the existing paradigm. Since the historically espoused rationales for affording labor speech lessened protection are unprincipled and
unpersuasive, and since that leaves nothing but illegitimate restriction based on the content of speech, labor unions ought to
receive the same constitutional rights to peacefully picket as
other public protestors.
B. THE PROBLEM OF SELECTIVE EXCLUSION: A SERIES OF
UNPERSUASIVE RATIONALES
Historically, domestic courts have adduced four main rationales for prohibiting picketing in general, and selectively
prohibiting labor picketing in particular. These justifications
207. See Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 436, 438–39.
208. Id. at 438.
209. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 889, 909–11 (1982).
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can be labeled as follows: (1) the inherently coercive argument,
(2) the speech-plus argument, (3) the special congressional balancing rationale, and (4) the labor-speech-as-commercialspeech argument. None of these traditionally proffered reasons,
however, adequately or cogently justify drawing a constitutional discrepancy between labor and nonlabor communicative conduct.
1. The Inadequacy of the Inherently Coercive Rationale
The inherently coercive argument asserts that picketing is
beyond constitutional protection because it is necessarily and
categorically coercive.210 Although the view originally stems
from traditional common law,211 it was explicitly reaffirmed in
International Longshoremen’s Ass’n212 and is implicitly assumed in the picketing/nonpicketing distinction currently employed.213 Despite its historical tenacity, the argument ultimately fails to justify either the general or selective exclusion
of otherwise peaceful picketing from constitutional protection.
There are two cardinal reasons why the inherently coercive
argument does not support a general exclusion of picketing
from constitutional protection. First, the view is based on a dubious ontological assumption—unsupported by experience or
empirical evidence—that picketing is always and intrinsically
coercive.214 It seems highly improbable that pure and abstract
ratiocination on the inherent attributes or effects of picketing is
sufficient to establish its categorical coerciveness. Rather, as
Tree Fruits and Thornhill acknowledged, picketing is not necessarily a coercive act.215 Certainly, it has the potential to

210. See WHITEHEAD, supra note 14, at 70–71; Anderson, supra note 16, at
830; Beard, supra note 15, at 218–19.
211. See WHITEHEAD, supra note 14, at 69–71.
212. See Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 226
(1982) (treating a secondary labor boycott as inherently coercive conduct).
213. Kentov v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n Local 15, 418 F.3d 1259,
1264 –66 (11th Cir. 2005) (analyzing whether a mock funeral procession was
more analogous to unlawful picketing or lawful handbilling); see also Sheet
Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 438 (determining whether secondary
activity amounts to lawful handbilling or coercive and illicit picketing).
214. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 438 (noting that if the
behavior in question was the “‘functional equivalent of picketing’ . . . [it was]
therefore coercive and unlawful”).
215. See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760
(Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 71–72 (1964) (refusing to find that all consumer
picketing is coercive and prohibited under the NLRA); Thornhill v. Alabama,
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coerce listeners, whether through violence, serious threats, confrontational conduct, obstruction of entryways, or other accompanying activity.216 However, like in Safeco, much labor picketing may be wholly peaceful, orderly, and unintimidating.217
Second, the presupposition of coerciveness is undermined by
Claiborne Hardware’s extension of constitutional protection to
public-issue picketing.218 If all picketing, no matter how benign,
is inherently coercive, then it would be difficult to justify First
Amendment protection for conduct that necessarily precludes
reasoned and voluntary discourse.
Not only does the inherently coercive argument fail to justify a categorical ban on peaceful picketing, it also cannot account for the selective prohibition of secondary labor picketing.
Essentially, if all picketing is inherently coercive, then all picketing should be subject to regulation on the same terms as labor picketing. However, Claiborne Hardware’s hierarchical distinction between public-issue and labor picketing clearly
repudiates this notion.219 Moreover, if this were the case, why
should we permit primary labor picketing, as the NLRA expressly does?220
2. The Inadequacy of the Speech-Plus Rationale
In a certain sense, the speech-plus argument attempts to
evade the problem of selectively excluding or prohibiting labor
picketing. As advanced by Justice Stevens in Safeco, the
speech-plus argument contends that labor picketing can be enjoined because it calls for a reflexive and unthinking “response
to a signal, rather than a reasoned response to an idea.”221
Thus, in the labor context, picketing can be barred without implicating free speech guarantees because it elicits automatic effects irrespective of the ideas disseminated.222 There are two
310 U.S. 88, 105–06 (1940) (rejecting the argument that violence, breaches of
the peace, or invasion of privacy rights are inherent attributes of picketing).
216. See Note, supra note 20, at 952.
217. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447
U.S. 607, 609–10 (1980) (describing how picketers merely carried signs and
distributed handbills); see also Note, supra note 20, at 952–53 (“[M]uch consumer picketing . . . is wholly peaceful.”).
218. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911, 913 (1982).
219. See id. at 913, 915.
220. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (2000) (excluding primary labor picketing from the statutory
ban).
221. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring).
222. See id.
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crucial facets to note about the rationale. First, it assumes that
labor picketing is more than speech because Americans tend to
respond sympathetically to union protests. Second, it is fundamentally a cunning, though narrower, reiteration of the inherently coercive argument. That is, in the labor context, there
presumably exists a unique and insidious mechanism by which
even peaceful picketing elicits automatic responses independent of any message conveyed. As such, it can be said to “coercively” trigger involuntary and thoughtless reactions.
Given its affinity with the inherently coercive argument,
the speech-plus argument is vulnerable to similar criticism.
Like its intellectual kin, it rests on the specious premise that
labor picketing coerces its listeners into thoughtlessly capitulating to union demands. Experience, however, does not appear
to vindicate such a supposition. Moreover, even assuming that
union picketing precipitates reflexive responses based on general attitudes towards labor, it is not unique in harboring the
potential for inducing action irrespective of ideas. Other forms
of constitutionally protected expression, such as civil rights or
abortion protests, may also elicit reflexive responses based on
an individual’s general attitude or deeply ingrained beliefs.223
Yet, if Stevens’s argument were to stand, it would militate towards diminished protection for any public appeal to deeply entrenched beliefs of any kind. Since many public protests—
whether championing racial equality or deriding abortion
rights—may elicit automatic responses, they would also be vulnerable to attack and lessened protection on speech-plus
grounds. Ultimately, since the inducement of automatic responses is not an idiosyncratic attribute of labor picketing, the
speech-plus argument fails to account for the disparate treatment of labor and nonlabor speech.

223. For example, although Americans have shown deep and inveterate
respect for religious values and the sanctity of life, this has not been grounds
to subject abortion protests to diminished or nonexistent First Amendment
protection. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 773–74
(1994) (affirming the First Amendment right of abortion protestors to carry
offensive placards and convey unpalatable messages); see also Rakoczy, supra
note 28, at 1640 (discussing the Claiborne Hardware Court’s approval of picketing to encourage the boycotting of stores that refused to support racial integration as constitutionally protected).
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3. The Inadequacy of the Special Congressional Balancing
Rationale
A third approach to the selective exclusion of secondary labor picketing from constitutional protection is the special congressional balancing argument. Inaugurated by Justice Blackmun’s concurrence in Safeco,224 the argument was resurrected
in Claiborne Hardware to differentiate labor picketing from
“public-issue” picketing.225 As formulated by Justice Blackmun,
prohibition of secondary labor picketing is permissible as an instance of Congress striking a balance between union freedom of
speech and the ability of neutral parties “to remain free from
coerced participation in industrial strife.”226 Accordingly, differential treatment of labor and nonlabor picketing is justified
because Congress holds a uniquely robust interest in preventing coerced participation in economic discord.
Although the special balancing rationale eschews the problem of general prohibition, it fails to cogently justify a selective
prohibition on labor picketing. First, as trenchantly observed in
Sheet Metal Workers’ International Ass’n, the proposition does
nothing to clarify the meaning or scope of coercion.227 It merely
begs the question of what activity constitutes coercion and, correlatively, can be prohibited under the NLRA. Consequently, if
labor picketing is not necessarily coercive, then it can be implemented without triggering Congress’s interest in preventing
coerced participation in industrial strife. Second, it is not altogether clear why the government possesses, or should possess,
a greater interest in preventing coerced participation in industrial strife as opposed to racial strife, political strife, ideological
strife, or religious strife.228 As such, the view does not adequately account for the distinction between labor and nonlabor
protests over potentially polarizing social issues. Additionally,
as International Longshoremen’s Ass’n explicitly observed, it is
224. See Safeco, 447 U.S. at 617–18 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
225. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912–13 (1982).
226. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 617–18 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
227. See Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, Local 15 v. NLRB, 491 F.3d 429,
437 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
228. Justice Blackmun’s articulation of the balancing rationale simply invoked Congress’s interest in preventing industrial strife. See Safeco, 447 U.S.
at 617–18 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Likewise, in Claiborne Hardware, the
Court merely invoked the strong governmental interest in economic regulation; it did not provide any detailed rationale as to why there is a greater interest in preventing economic discord over sociopolitical strife. See Claiborne
Hardware, 458 U.S. at 912.
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often difficult to distinguish pickets aimed solely at political
change and those seeking purely economic aims.229 A boycott,
as in Claiborne Hardware, may integrate both objectives.230 In
such circumstances, it becomes quite difficult to determine
whether Congress maintains a superlative regulatory interest
since speech may facilitate both industrial and political strife.
4. The Inadequacy of the Commercial Speech Rationale
The labor-speech-as-commercial-speech argument is the final commonly espoused rationale for singling out union activity
for diminished constitutional protection. The view rests on the
premise that there exists a hierarchy of First Amendment values, with political or public-issue speech at its apex and commercial or economic speech occupying a subordinate echelon.231
Due to its comparatively low hierarchical position, commercial
speech is subject to both decreased constitutional protection
and increased governmental regulation.232 Within this conceptual framework, the rationale posits an equivalence between
labor and commercial speech because the former purportedly
concerns parochial economic interests, rather than matters of
important public concern.233 Thus, in contrast to public-issue or
political speech, labor speech is said to be subject to selective
exclusion or prohibition.234
Since its delineation in Claiborne Hardware, the distinction between labor and political speech was significantly weakened by DeBartolo II’s suggestion that certain forms of union
activity might constitute political speech of public concern.235
229. See Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 225
(1982) (“The distinction between labor and political objectives would be difficult to draw in many cases.”).
230. The civil rights boycott in Claiborne Hardware included demands for
racial desegregation as well as jobs for African Americans. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 899–900.
231. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466–67 (1980) (declaring that public-issue picketing “has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of
First Amendment values”); see also Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 913
(quoting Carey’s declaration that public-issue speech rests on the highest tier
of First Amendment values).
232. See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 913, 915.
233. See id. (distinguishing public-issue boycotts from boycotts with merely
economic interests).
234. See id. at 914–15 (implying that boycotts with merely economic interests would be subject to regulation or prohibition).
235. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council (DeBartolo II), 485 U.S. 568, 576 (1988) (“We do not suggest
that communications by labor unions are never of the commercial speech va-
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Nevertheless, the distinction remains intact as a potential, if
not actual, impediment to comparable First Amendment guarantees for labor and public-issue communication. Unfortunately, like the other rationales assessed, the labor-speech-ascommercial-speech argument fails to provide a principled justification for differential protection.
There are at least two salient reasons why the commercial
speech rationale fails to justify asymmetric protection for labor
and political speech. First, as declared in International Longshoremen’s Ass’n, it is often difficult to distinguish pickets embodying purely political objectives from those advocating mere
economic change.236 Even the civil rights boycott in Claiborne
Hardware involved appeals to achieve economic gains for a specific social group, not simply demands for political or racial
equality.237 In fact, of all the Supreme Court cases involving
secondary protests, the boycott in International Longshoremen’s Ass’n was arguably the most manifestly political since it
lacked the intermediate or ancillary aim of economic gain.238
Nevertheless, the boycott’s political and moral objection to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan presented no obstacle to its ultimate prohibition.239 The point, however, is that in our postlaissez-faire society, where government intervention in most
spheres of social and economic life is a quotidian affair, it is
impossible to delineate an objective distinction between political and economic speech.240 This is because both spheres of activity significantly and mutually impact one another.241 Under
such circumstances, the labor-political distinction does not offer
a coherent or consistent framework for determining the requisite level of constitutional protection for a given protest.
More importantly, it is analytically unsound, historically
myopic, and fundamentally biased to equate labor speech with
riety and thereby entitled to a lesser degree of constitutional protection. The
handbills involved here, however, do not appear to be typical commercial
speech . . . for they pressed the benefits of unionism to the community . . . .”).
236. See Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 225
(1982).
237. One of the goals sought in Claiborne Hardware was to provide jobs for
African Americans, surely an economic or labor-related aim. See Claiborne
Hardware, 458 U.S. at 899–900.
238. Getman, supra note 48, at 17; see Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 456 U.S.
at 222–23 (detailing how the withholding of union labor was strictly motivated
by the objection to Soviet military policy).
239. See Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 456 U.S. at 223–26.
240. Atleson, supra note 18, at 165, 167.
241. See id.
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commercial speech that simply proposes a commercial transaction or is solely related to economic self-interest.242 Rather, the
premises of Thornhill and Swing remain valid; peaceful labor
picketing extends beyond mere matters of private economic
concern to issues of fundamental public interest.243 As articulated in Thornhill, the welfare of present and future generations depends on labor matters—whether satisfactory hours,
fair wages, or hospitable working conditions—and their widespread repercussions.244 Additionally, the panoply of laborrelated legislation attests to the fact that labor relations are
not matters of mere parochial concern, but of great interest to
the general polity.245 Absent the potential for such interest and
concomitant support, there would seem to be little reason for
the bevy of economic and labor-related legislation.
Not only do labor protests implicate matters of public concern, there is also no persuasive argument for why union activity cannot and should not be deemed political action. Both labor
and nonlabor boycotts may reflect a broader goal of redistributing economic benefits, whether to minorities or workers.246 Just
as race or gender discrimination may highlight a broader phenomenon of social inequity, a labor dispute signifies the position of workers in an economic system based on private and limited ownership of the means of production.247 Yet we do not
characterize women’s appeals for higher wages and equality of
remuneration as reflecting parochial commercial interests bereft of public or political concern. Why then should we charac242. Commercial speech has been defined as speech that merely proposes a
commercial transaction or is solely related to narrow economic interests. Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
243. See Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 326 (1941) (“The interdependence of economic interest of all engaged in the same industry has become a commonplace. The right of free communication cannot therefore be
mutilated by denying it to workers, in a dispute with an employer, even
though they are not in his employ.” (citation omitted)); Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 103 (1940) (“[L]abor relations are not matters of mere local or private concern. Free discussion concerning . . . labor disputes appears to us indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society.”).
244. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 103.
245. Id. (“The merest glance at state and federal legislation on the subject
demonstrates the force of the argument that labor relations are not matters of
mere local or private concern.”).
246. See Getman, supra note 48, at 17.
247. Note, supra note 20, at 955.
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terize labor protests in such a way? After all, in a social system
where health care and higher education are largely privatized
and quite expensive, labor speech aimed at immediate economic
gains signals broader, more fundamental concerns. That is, this
speech marks an attempt to secure a better life for oneself,
one’s family, one’s descendants, and for other workers facing
unsatisfactory wages and prohibitive costs. Given this reality,
it is inaccurate and belittling to equate labor protests with
mere profit-making activity such as product advertising.248
Moreover, to do so seems to reflect nothing more than a prejudicial vestige of Cold War antipathy to union activity and labor demands. How else do we account for the refusal in International Longshoremen’s Ass’n to establish an exception to the
secondary boycott ban for politically based disputes with foreign nations?249 If even political and morally righteous union
activity can be blithely proscribed, then the distinction between
labor and political speech seems to reflect nothing more than
class bias.
C. THE REPUGNANT RESIDUE OF CONTENT-BASED REGULATION
Given the inadequacy of the articulated rationales for
meaningfully differentiating labor and nonlabor picketing, we
are left with nothing but unconstitutional content-based discrimination. As Mosley made clear, selective exclusion from
public fora may not be based on content alone and may not be
justified by reference to content alone.250 Yet, without a persuasive rationale for selectively restricting secondary labor picketing, what is left but the content of speech itself? Consequently,
since the subject matter of the speech—labor or nonlabor—
appears to be the determinative factor in applicable levels of
protection and regulation, the asymmetrical treatment of labor
and nonlabor boycotts constitutes an impermissible contentbased restriction.251 To avoid this constitutional quandary, it is
necessary to interpret the NLRA’s secondary boycott ban as
248. As noted, the exemplar of commercial speech is advertising the price
or merits of commodities. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg.
& Constr. Trades Council (DeBartolo II ), 485 U.S. 568, 576 (1988).
249. See Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 224–
25 (1982).
250. See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94–96 (1972).
251. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461–65 (1980) (invalidating a picketing ordinance that discriminated on the basis of subject matter); Mosley, 408
U.S. at 95–96 (abrogating a picketing ordinance whose “operative distinction
is the message on a picket sign”).
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prohibiting only those types of protest activity not protected by
generally applicable First Amendment precepts and precedent.
Accordingly, we must construct a new methodological framework for interpreting section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)’s ban on coercive secondary activity to ensure it remains within constitutional limits.
III. A NEW MODEL OF COERCION
A. TOWARD A CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTION OF COERCION
To bring the NLRA’s ban on coercive secondary labor boycotts back within First Amendment bounds, it is necessary to
interpret section 8(b)(4)(ii)’s prohibition on coercion in a way
that does not conflict with comparable activity protected when
undertaken by other social groups. As a practical matter, this
means constructing a new definition and methodology for understanding the meaning and scope of coercion. A conventional
definition of coercion is conduct that “overwhelm[s the] will” of
another.252 As the definition indicates, the concept of coercion
involves two facets: a relational component (i.e., the other
whose will is overcome) and a substantive component (i.e., the
conduct that overwhelms). Thus, we must determine both the
substantive content of “coercion,” as well as the perspective
from which it is to be assessed.
1. The Customer Is King: The Relational Component of
Coercion
Coercion is clearly a relational concept. One neither coerces
in the abstract nor coerces oneself; coercion is always coercion
of another. Thus, a preliminary inquiry is from whose perspective do we assess the coerciveness of conduct? In the context of
secondary consumer boycotts, there are two possible perspectives—that of the consumer and that of the secondary business.
As the case law reveals, there has been ambiguity and inconsistency in whether coercion is a function of potential economic
harm to a secondary business or a function of the effects on
targeted consumers.253 The distinction between the two, how252. Jones, supra note 31, at 1028.
253. Coercion was judged from the perspective of the immediate consumer
audience in DeBartolo II, Tree Fruits, and Thornhill. See DeBartolo II, 485
U.S. at 578–80; NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local
760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 72–73 (1964); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88, 104 (1940). In contrast, coercion was assessed in relation to the economic
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ever, is critical. We must not confuse coercion of immediate listeners with economic pressure exerted as a result of those freely complying with union appeals.254 In other words, it is analytically unsound to equate speech that persuades listeners to
exert economic pressure by freely withholding patronage with
speech that is itself coercive.
Given the need to specify the perspective from which coercion is assessed, there are several reasons for analyzing it from
the vantage point of the consumer. First, and probably the least
persuasive argument, is precedent. As both DeBartolo II and
Claiborne Hardware suggest, coercion should be understood as
a function of the impact exerted upon consumers or immediate
listeners.255 Consequently, labor picketing should not be devoid
of constitutional protection because it may induce others to
take action inconsistent with the economic interests of a secondary business. As Claiborne Hardware indicated, the fact
that a boycott has a substantial impact on merchants does not
render it subject to proscription absent a finding that “fear rather than protected conduct” was the dominant force behind its
public support.256
A second reason for analyzing coercion from a consumer
perspective emerges when one considers that every expression
of opinion may potentially induce action unfavorable to one social group.257 As such, the mere presence of action inconsistent
with one’s interests should not be grounds for prohibiting othrepercussions attending a secondary business in International Longshoremen’s
Ass’n and Safeco. See Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 456 U.S. at 223; NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 613–14 (1980).
The inconsistent approach to analyzing coercion is also evident in the recent
circuit split over the status of a mock funeral procession. Compare Sheet Metal
Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, Local 15 v. NLRB, 491 F.3d 429, 437–38 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(focusing on the effects of coercion on potential patrons), with Kentov v. Sheet
Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n Local 15, 418 F.3d 1259, 1265–66 (11th Cir. 2005)
(concentrating on the fact that a secondary boycott was aimed at exerting
pressure on a secondary business by dissuading patronage).
254. See Anderson, supra note 16, at 830–31.
255. See DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 578 (noting the lack of any suggestion
that the labor activity had a coercive impact on “customers”); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 909–10 (1982) (focusing on the manner in
which listeners or patrons were enlisted in the boycott).
256. See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 934.
257. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 104 (“Every expression of opinion on matters
that are important has the potentiality of inducing action in the interests of
one rather than another group in society. But the group in power . . . may not
impose penal sanctions on peaceful and truthful discussion . . . [by] showing
that others may thereby be persuaded to take action inconsistent with its interests.”).
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erwise protected and peaceful expression. Just because a political organization may persuade a considerable portion of the
electorate to “boycott” an incumbent candidate or a particular
piece of legislation does not mean that the incumbent was
“coerced” into leaving office or abandoning the legislation. Under our democratic and republican system of governance, such
advocacy is a legitimate and prized exercise of liberty, not a
coercive tactic to be decried and forbidden.258 Our free market
economy is similarly premised on the notion that individual
consumers possess economic freedom for which businesses
compete.259 If a union peacefully persuades consumers to exercise this freedom in a manner inconsistent with the economic
interests of a business, it is inaccurate to claim that the business was unlawfully coerced.260 Yet, if coercion were premised
on economic harm, any consumer appeal to undertake a “wholly
legal course of action”261 could be prohibited as coercive activity.
The foregoing discussion suggests yet another difficulty in
analyzing coercion pursuant to the economic harm attending a
secondary business. Essentially, to do so would proscribe other
authorized and protected inducements to boycott such as leaflets, newspaper ads, or public speeches.262 Since these constitutionally protected activities can exert economic consequences
comparable to peacefully persuasive picketing, judging coercion
258. Cf. BRUCE MIROFF ET AL., DEBATING DEMOCRACY 2–3 (1997) (discussing how free and fair debate, including the freedom to persuade and deliberate, is the “lifeblood of democracy”).
259. See Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, in MIROFF ET AL., supra note 258, at 56, 60–61 (discussing the relationship between the free market system and economic freedom: “free to enter or not enter into any particular [economic] exchange”).
260. See DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 580 (“The loss of customers because they
read a handbill urging them not to patronize a business . . . is the result of
mere persuasion, and the neutral who reacts is doing no more than what its
customers honestly want it to do.”).
261. See id. at 575.
262. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907, 909–11
(1982) (observing that speeches, newspaper articles, and pamphleteering are
forms of communication generally protected under the First Amendment); see
also DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 576 (indicating that a prohibition on leafleting
the general public would “pose a substantial issue of validity under the First
Amendment”); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local
760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 69 (1964) (suggesting that a prohibition on leafleting, radio broadcasts, and newspaper advertisements would pose serious
First Amendment implications); 105 CONG. REC. 17,818, 17,898–99 (1959)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy) (explaining that the secondary boycott ban was
not meant to prohibit handbilling, newspaper ads, or radio broadcasts).
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from the perspective of a secondary business would necessitate
that they be enjoined as coercive activity. Thus, a businessbased conception of coercion does not allow for drawing a meaningful distinction between activities such as handbilling and
barricading an entryway, since both could exert grave economic
harm. Coercion would therefore be converted into an overinclusive concept covering both protected and unprotected conduct.
To avoid such a scenario, coercion should be limited to the effects on an intended and immediate audience: the consumers
themselves.
The perspectival problem of coercion can also be approached from a slightly different angle, analogizing it to
another constitutional dilemma—that of the heckler’s veto.263
The heckler’s veto presents the following problem: what if the
danger of speech arises from the reactions of a hostile crowd,
rather than from a sympathetic and immediate audience?264
Several Supreme Court cases confronting the issue reject the
proposition that the reaction of a hostile audience justifies the
suppression of otherwise permissible First Amendment activity.265 For example, in Terminiello v. Chicago, a racist demagogue addressing a sympathetic audience sparked agitation
and violence amongst a hostile crowd situated outside the
speaking forum.266 The speaker was subsequently arrested and
convicted of violating a statute that prohibited stirring the public to anger, inviting dispute, or fomenting unrest.267 Reversing
the conviction, the Supreme Court suggested that any danger
or disorder arising from a hostile crowd reaction cannot justify
suppression of speech unless it is likely “to produce a clear and
present danger . . . that rises far above public inconvenience,

263. For a general discussion of the heckler’s veto or hostile audience problem, see JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW
80–83 (2d ed. 2000).
264. Id. at 80.
265. See Gregory v. City of Chi., 394 U.S. 111, 111–13 (1969) (rejecting the
claim that the unruly acts of onlookers could justify the suppression of an otherwise peaceful civil rights march); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 –5
(1949) (overturning the conviction of a speaker who stirred a hostile crowd to
anger and unrest); see also Vill. of Skokie v. Nat’l Socialist Party of Am., 373
N.E.2d 21, 25 (Ill. 1978) (“‘[I]t has become patent that a hostile audience is not
a basis for restraining otherwise legal First Amendment activity.’” (quoting
Collin v. Chi. Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746, 754 (7th Cir. 1972))).
266. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 2–3; see id. at 16, 20–22 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 2–3 (majority opinion).
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annoyance, or unrest.”268 Of course, such a position makes intuitive sense. If a heckler’s veto could be used to censor speech,
then hostile crowds could simply feign offense or threaten disorder in order to suppress unpopular sentiments.
The position of secondary businesses can be compared to
hostile crowds on two grounds. First, both entities are relatively remote; that is, they are not the immediately intended addressees of the expression. In a secondary consumer boycott,
the consumer is the immediately intended recipient of the message.269 Similarly, in a case like Terminiello, the individuals in
the auditorium—not the hostile crowd outside—are the immediately intended addressees.270 Second, both entities are predisposed to resent the expression because it conflicts with their
interests—social, political, economic, or otherwise. To complete
the analogy, if the potentially dangerous effects of speech on a
hostile crowd cannot justify its suppression, then the possible
harmful effects on a secondary business should likewise be insufficient grounds to censor labor expression. Of course, this
assumes that the speech in question does not coerce its intended and potentially sympathetic audience. But this is the
point—coercion should be assessed from the vantage point of its
principally intended audience. Moreover, if we are bound to apply similar standards to labor and nonlabor speech, then the
Court’s rejection of a heckler’s veto provides a final basis for
construing coercion from the perspective of consumers.
2. Formal Equality and Objectively Reasonable People: The
Substance of Coercion
Having dispensed with the relational component of coercion, it remains to articulate its substance. In the context of
secondary consumer boycotts, the inquiry can be framed as follows: from the perspective of a potential patron, what types of
union activity would or should be deemed coercive? The query
can be answered at two complementary levels of analysis or
generality: a macrolevel and a microlevel. At the macrolevel,
union activity protected under general First Amendment precepts and precedent must not be prohibited as coercive conduct,
lest we resurrect the specter of content-based discrimination.
At the microlevel, we can employ an objective reasonable per268. Id. at 4.
269. See Vlasek, supra note 33, at 181 (describing how secondary boycotts
target otherwise neutral parties, such as customers).
270. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 2–3.
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son standard to determine whether the conduct truly exerts a
coercive impact on consumers.
a. The Macrolevel of Analysis
To evade the constitutional quandary of content-based restrictions, we must understand the content of coercion in a
manner that does not conflict with general First Amendment
guarantees. On a formal level, this proposition entails that
conduct protected in nonlabor contexts should not be characterized as coercive or unlawful when undertaken by a labor union. Although this principle of formal equality does nothing to
delineate the specific content of protected conduct, it is meant
to provide a limit to governmental regulation of union activity.
To delineate the specific content of coercion, however, we can
look to First Amendment decisions within and without the labor context.
Without embarking upon the abstract and amorphous terrain of constitutional scrutiny levels, there are two general
First Amendment doctrines that help to sketch the content and
contours of coercion. First, the Supreme Court has long held
that there is a narrow set of speech categories that cannot
claim First Amendment protection and, therefore, are subject
to complete regulation.271 These categories of unprotected
speech include fighting words, true threats, obscenity, speech
that presents a clear and present danger, and speech that is
likely to incite imminent lawlessness.272 Of course, picketing is
more than speech, combining both speech and nonspeech elements.273 Consequently, a second First Amendment doctrine is
relevant to the issue of picketing—labor or otherwise.
Under the speech-plus doctrine, or expression-action dichotomy, the First Amendment does not protect those nonspeech elements that may induce action irrespective of the
ideas communicated.274 In other words, public protests lose
271. Heidi Kitrosser, Containing Unprotected Speech, 57 FLA. L. REV. 843,
844–45 (2005); see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927–
28 (1982) (outlining the few categories of speech that are not protected by the
First Amendment).
272. See Kitrosser, supra note 271, at 844 –45; Mackson-Landsberg, supra
note 24, at 1529–30.
273. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447
U.S. 607, 619 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring); WHITEHEAD, supra note 14, at
73.
274. See Safeco, 447 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring) (invoking the
speech-conduct distinction to justify barring labor picketing that does not call
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their First Amendment protection when they induce action
through force of conduct rather the strength of ideas.275 Protests may thus be regulated where they achieve their ends
through “intimidat[ion] by a line of picketers”276 or where “fear
rather than protected conduct [is] the dominant force” behind
their public support.277
Combining the two doctrines, we can formulate a preliminary test for determining whether boycott activity is constitutionally protected and, thus, immune from prohibition under
section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). Essentially, as long as a union does not
engage in activity that consists of fighting words, true threats,
a call to imminent illegal action, or conduct that induces action
independent of ideas, it should not be deemed coercive under
the NLRA.
b. The Microlevel of Analysis
The preliminary formulation of the coercion test leaves one
fundamental question unresolved. Namely, how do we determine what conduct coercively induces action irrespective of the
strength of the ideas communicated? The answer is actually
somewhat implicit in the foregoing First Amendment analysis.
Take, for example, the definition of fighting words as speech
“likely to provoke the average person to retaliation.”278 Somewhat similarly, obscenity has been defined, inter alia, as material that “the average person” would view as appealing to
prurient interests279 and for which no reasonable person would
find serious value.280 These categories of unprotected conduct,
thus, include an objective reasonable or ordinary person standard for determining whether or not an activity is entitled to
constitutional protection. Conjoining this latent standard with
the traditional definition of coercion as conduct that “overfor a reasoned response to an idea).
275. See id.
276. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council (DeBartolo II ), 485 U.S. 568, 580 (1988).
277. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 934 (1982).
278. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (reiterating the “average person” standard).
279. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (promulgating a tripartite obscenity test that includes an average person standard).
280. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500–01 (1987) (declaring that the
third prong of the Miller obscenity test should rest on a reasonable person
standard).
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whelm[s the] will,”281 we can employ an objective reasonable
person test to answer the lingering question of coercion.282
When union activity does not fall within a category of unprotected speech, it can only be prohibited when it is so substantial that no reasonable person, no person of ordinary fortitude, would feel at liberty to ignore the union’s demands. This
is what may be termed the microlevel of analysis. The appellation is meant to emphasize that the proposed reasonable person
test is not distinct from the general First Amendment inquiry.
Rather, it merely serves to underscore what is arguably already
implicit in the latter. The hope is that the reasonable person
standard will provide greater guidance in identifying coercion,
while ensuring that regulated conduct does not fall within First
Amendment bounds. As such, it remains imperative that the
standard abide by the principle of formal equality—that labor
and nonlabor protests receive comparable constitutional protection.
Under the proposed reasonable person test, the following
activities—all of which have been noted by courts—are likely to
constitute coercion under the NLRA: violence, serious threats,
physical and symbolic obstruction of entryways, interference
with the ingress or egress of consumers, or other confrontational or intimidating conduct.283 The reason for this is quite simple: the enumerated activities are likely to overcome the will of
a person of ordinary fortitude, leaving her unable to freely disregard union pressure and patronize a secondary business. The
281. Jones, supra note 31, at 1028.
282. Interestingly, an ordinary person standard was invoked in Sheet Metal Workers’ International Ass’n to bolster its protection of a mock funeral procession. See Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, Local 15 v. NLRB, 491 F.3d 429,
439 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (rejecting the claim of coercion on the grounds that the
protest was not “one by which a person of ordinary fortitude would be intimidated”).
283. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council (DeBartolo II ), 485 U.S. 568, 578–80 (1988) (protecting a labor
boycott that did not involve intimidation by a line of picketers, violence, or patrolling); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760
(Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 60–61, 71–73 (1964) (upholding the legitimacy of a
peaceful picket that did not interfere with the ingress of consumers or obstruct
deliveries); Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 437–38 (protecting a
boycott that was orderly, did not physically interfere with or confront patrons,
and did not create a symbolic barrier to entry via patrolling); Overstreet v.
United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 1506, 409 F.3d
1199, 1202, 1211–12 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding a boycott that did not involve
confrontational conduct or the creation of a physical or symbolic barrier to
consumer entry).
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foregoing list, however, is not an exhaustive account of coercive
labor activity. Rather, it illustrates the types of conduct likely
to satisfy the reasonable person standard for coercion. Nevertheless, absent truly coercive activity, unions should be free to
engage in peaceful picketing.
Synthesizing the macrolevel and microlevels of analysis,
we can define coercive activity, for purposes of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B), as including unprotected speech and conduct so
substantial that it would overcome the will of a reasonable and
ordinary person. Essentially, so long as the boycott does not
consist of fighting words, present a clear and present danger,
incite imminent lawless conduct, or contain activity likely to
overcome the will of a reasonable person of ordinary fortitude,
the union should not be held to have committed an unfair labor
practice under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). Obviously, under the proposed test of coercion, certain forms of peaceful picketing, as
well as other boycott measures, can and should be considered
legitimate exercises of First Amendment rights. Accordingly,
the D.C. Circuit was correct in holding that the mock funeral
procession was not coercive in violation of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B).284 Given that the procession was orderly, nonconfrontational, and occurred a hundred feet from the hospital entrance285—creating neither a physical or symbolic barrier to entry—it was not sufficient to prevent an ordinary person from
patronizing the hospital. Although some may have found the
spectacle distasteful, unnerving, and even offensive, it could
not be considered coercive.
B. IMPLICATIONS: VAGUENESS, THWARTED INTENT, OR
ECONOMIC RUIN?
There are at least three objections that the proposed coercion test may confront. First, some may argue that the complementary First Amendment and reasonable person analyses
are still too general or vague. Since the primary concern of this
Note is symmetrical protection for labor and nonlabor picketing, such a general standard seems sufficient. Additionally, the
proposed test might be advantageous insofar as it anticipates
change and permits flexibility in First Amendment jurisprudence. All that it requires is uniformity of treatment for labor
and nonlabor activities.
284. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 439.
285. Id. at 432–33, 438.
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Second, some may argue that the test, by permitting certain forms of secondary picketing, undercuts the purpose of the
secondary boycott ban. To the extent that this objection is accurate, this is the proverbial price of living in an open and democratic society that values plurality of opinion and freedom of
expression. Under such a system, Congress does not have the
right to rescind or curtail free expression, nor to “grant the use
of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny
use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.”286 Moreover, if the unequivocal purpose behind the
legislative ban is to protect “wholly neutral parties” from compelled participation in labor disputes, the proposed test does
not, as a practical matter, contravene that intent. Boycotts are
presumably onerous, expensive, and time-consuming affairs.
Accordingly, it seems unlikely that they would be employed
against wholly neutral parties who have not economically supported or interacted with a primary target in some significant
way.
Third, some may claim that affording greater protection
and latitude to labor boycott activities may exert a serious or
calamitous impact on the economy. Although it is theoretically
possible, it seems unlikely that secondary labor picketing will
have grave economic repercussions. Again, given the onus of
conducting such activity, it seems likely that unions would
rarely institute such measures, especially where the secondary
target is genuinely neutral vis-à-vis a labor dispute.
CONCLUSION
Several recurring rationales have been espoused for exempting secondary labor picketing from the robust First
Amendment protection bestowed upon its public-issue analog.
It has been argued that labor picketing is inherently coercive,287 that it uniquely elicits reflexive responses independent
of any ideas conveyed,288 that Congress maintains an incomparable interest in preventing “coerced participation in indus-

286. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
287. See WHITEHEAD, supra note 14, at 70–71; Jones, supra note 31, at
1024; Mackson-Landsberg, supra note 24, at 1527.
288. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447
U.S. 607, 619 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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trial strife,”289 and that labor speech is simply a form of lowvalue commercial speech that merely implicates parochial economic interests.290 For various, though occasionally overlapping
reasons, none of these rationales justify drawing a meaningful
distinction between labor and political picketing. In the absence
of a sufficient rationale, the disparity of treatment seems to
rest on the very content of speech—whether it is labor-related
or not. As Sheet Metal Workers acknowledged in its own limited
way, the disparity in treatment thereby amounts to impermissible content-based discrimination.291
To avoid the specter of content-based restriction, the
NLRA’s ban on coercive secondary activity must be construed
in a manner that conforms to general First Amendment precepts and precedent—those applicable to other public-issue
pickets. In terms of perspective, this principle of equality necessitates that coercion be judged from the vantage point of the
immediately intended recipients of the appeal. In secondary
consumer boycotts, the relevant frame of reference is that of potential patrons, not the secondary businesses subject to potential economic harm. Extending comparable protection also has
an impact on our substantive understanding of coercion. At a
macrolevel, it entails that activity protected under general
First Amendment principles and case law must not be deemed
unlawfully coercive when undertaken by a union. At a microlevel, this Note has proposed an objective reasonable person
standard for determining whether labor conduct truly coerces
consumers and, thus, can be constitutionally enjoined. Ultimately, the concept of coercion should be limited to the narrow
categories of unprotected speech and conduct so substantial
that it would overcome the will of a reasonable person of ordinary fortitude. Under this formulation, certain forms of secondary labor picketing can and should be considered legitimate
exercises of First Amendment rights.

289. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912 (1982)
(quoting Safeco, 447 U.S. at 617–18 (Blackmun, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
290. See id. at 915.
291. See, e.g., Mosley, 408 U.S. at 94 –95 (holding that the First Amendment demands that the government not restrict speech because of its content).

